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Visual style hermeneutics: from style to context
Jakub Stejskal *
eikones – Center for the Theory and History of the Image, Universität Basel,
Basel, Switzerland
This essay re-examines the once promising idea that style analysis can
provide an independent source of insight into an artifact’s non-stylistic
context. The essay makes explicit the consequences of treating
collective style as such a source in archaeology and anthropology of
art, and further develops a new framing for the idea that avoids the
criticisms largely responsible for the decline in theoretical interest in
the epistemic import of visual style analysis since World War II. This
re-framing proposes that inference from style to context is
permissible on those occasions when a collective style signals by its
morphology its suitability to serve a certain function. And it does so
because it prescribes publicly certain modes of behavior or
spectatorship. Furthermore, the public nature of the signaling may
be such that it allows even uninitiated spectators to get a sense of it
and thus to gain access to some of the motivations and norms
informing the collective’s form of life.
Keywords: universal style; stylistic analysis; split representation;
bilateral symmetry
If nothing were left of an extinct race but a single button, I would be able to
infer, from the shape of that button, how these people dressed, built their
houses, how they lived, what was their religion, their art, their mentality.
Adolf Loos (Gombrich 1968, 358)
1. Introduction
Is it ever permissible to infer from style to context? Namely, is it ever jus-
tifiable to treat the character of a collective visual style as revelatory of the
collective’s norms, institutions, or attitudes? The question is both alluring
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and controversial. It is alluring because to answer it in the positive is to
suggest that analyzing visual styles of material cultures may provide inde-
pendent insight into these cultures’ circumstances, even when little is
known about them otherwise. It is controversial because the story of
efforts at such a stylistic analysis is rather unwholesome; what it reveals
is a reliance on holistic, essentializing, and often racialized notions of collec-
tive style as expressive of culture. To put it bluntly, it often reveals a whole
lot of ill-motivated wishful thinking mixed with reliance on pseudo-scienti-
fic conceptions of physiognomy and race-based anthropology (Gombrich
1963; Kasfir 1984; Summers 1989; Gell 1998, 216; Michaud 2019). This
helps explain why theoretical interest in the epistemic import of visual
style analysis has been in steady decline post-World War II in social and
historical sciences, the trend intensifying at least since the 1980s. There
has been no recent discussion of style comparable in its prominence to,
for example, debates on ‘isochrestic’ variation in archaeology (Sackett
1985, 1986, 1990; Wiessner 1985, 1990) or on the expressive power of
Oceanic styles in anthropology (Forge 1979; O’Hanlon 1992; Roscoe 1995;
O’Hanlon and Roscoe 1995). Perhaps most striking is the virtual disappear-
ance of theorizations of style in art history,1 where it has been the central
concept for much of the twentieth century, but ‘the king has been dead’
‘since the revolution of the seventies and eighties’ (Elsner 2003, 98).2
It would seem prudent, then, to be sceptical about the possibility of
there being a reliable general (let alone objective) way of correlating col-
lective styles and extra-stylistic context based on stylistic properties
alone; that is, a way which would ‘on pain of circularity […] separate out
those aspects of the impressions works give of their sources which
merely reflect what we already know or believe about them’ (Walton
2008, 248). Instead of defending the prospects of somehow rescuing
the largely discredited line of reasoning, I offer a different framing of
the problem that will dispense with the unwanted ideological baggage.
This re-framing proposes that inference from style to context is permiss-
ible on those occasions when a collective style signals by its morphology its
suitability to serve a certain function. And it does so because it prescribes
publicly certain modes of behavior or spectatorship. Furthermore, the
public nature of the signaling may be such that it allows even uninitiated
spectators to get a sense of it and thus to gain access to some of the motiv-
ations and norms informing the collective’s form of life.
This strategy promises both to keep the alluring prospects of inferring
from style to context and to avoid the major pitfalls of the various forms of
holistic expressivism. But it does so at a price: first, it goes against the
grain of the received wisdom about style in archaeology, anthropology,
and art history, namely, that there is no such thing as an objective demar-
cation of collective style (Ackerman 1962; Alpers 1987; Hodder 1990; Woll-
heim 1987, 1995; Shanks 1996; Elsner 2003). And second, it treats
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collective styles as instrumental structures, thus endangering the dis-
tinctness of classification by style, which has traditionally been
treated as different from classification by function (Sackett 1990;
Davis 1996, 173–174). At the same time, the notion that collective
styles provide access to their context by standing in some non-instru-
mental relation to it creates space for precisely those vague invocations
of collective expression or unconscious communication that have made
collective style analysis a deeply suspicious tool of social or historical
enquiry. In shutting that space down by tying style to instrumental
structure, my proposal provides solid immunity against similar spec-
ters. The crucial question facing us then becomes: how can collective
styles be thought of on the model of instrumental structures without
collapsing the difference between them?
After demonstrating what is at stake on the example of the Hittite
Sword God relief (Part 2), I review three ways in which collective visual
style has been understood to reveal information about context (Part 3):
First, stylistic accidence and variation have been treated as tracking
social stratification; second, stylistic characteristics have been used to cor-
roborate or lend support to non-stylistic evidence; and third, styles have
been perceived as evidence sui generis, implying context by their very
morphology. It is only the third kind that presents a clear case of inferring
from style to context. I then discuss what the required parameters of a cor-
responding notion of style should be, namely, that it be (in a specific, weak
sense) universal and non-conventional. And I show how these parameters
are applied in instrumental structure analysis that infers from mor-
phology to function (Part 4) to argue that the universal non-conventional
link between style and context should be framed in terms of instrumental-
ity (Part 5).
2. Sword God
In hilly Central Anatolia, just a kilometer outside of what was once the
Hittite Empire’s capital Hattusa, lies Yazılıkaya, the home of the
Empire’s central sanctuary. Among the reliefs and friezes dating back to
the 13th century BCE and covering the walls of the open-air rock shrine
one finds a remarkable relief sculpture. Carved into a rock face of a
narrow cleft called Chamber B and 3.38 m in height, it is the tallest of the
large reliefs in the sanctuary as well as the only one of them that implements
explicit vertical bilateral symmetry as its organizing principle (Figure 1). Its
singular appearance has not gone unnoticed. It has been described as
‘highly unusual’ (Seeher 2011, 114), ‘remarkable’ (Bittel 1978, 21), and
‘unique’ (Burney 2018, 308). Referred to as the ‘Sword God,’ the relief
depicts a figure composed of a profile of a human head with a peaked
and horned cap – a sign of deity – and a vertically split mirror image of
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two lion profiles. The composition suggests both a human-like figure and a
sword grip or hilt, the latter aspect supported by the depiction of what looks
like a double-edged blade of a dagger or a sword plunged into the ground
(Figure 2).
The leading expert on the sanctuary’s archaeology, Jürgen Seeher,
relies mainly on two facts to interpret the Sword God’s appearance. A
Hittite sword hilt survives that uses the lion motive and bears an inscrip-
tion dedicating it to what is assumed to be one of the gods of the under-
world. Yet the hilt, while symmetrical, looks nothing like the Sword God
and does not employ bilateral symmetry to compose an anthropomorphic
body – not to mention that it may predate the relief by half a millennium
(Figure 3). The second piece of information is that there also exists a
Hittite inscription describing the acts of a priest who models out of clay
god figures in the shape of swords and, depending on interpretation,
Figure 1. Sword God, 13th century BCE, Yazılıkaya, Turkey (reproduced from
Seeher 2011, 112; © Deutsches Archäologisches Institut, Boğazköy-Hattusa
Projekt. Reuse not permitted).
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either sticks them in or spreads them on the ground (Seeher 2011,
114–115).
If one wants to learn what motivates the unusual appearance of the
Sword God and what the appearance suggests about its context and the
environment within which the image was commissioned, produced, and
observed, the interpretation that relies on the two contextual facts and
that identifies the Sword God as one of the lords of the underworld is
rather frustrating. Granted, it does make an effort at explaining why the
relief employs bilateral symmetry and depicts lions – by speculating
about a stylistic tradition exemplified by an actual Hittite sword hilt.
But it does not infer from the presence of explicit vertical bilateral sym-
metry any observations about its possible context.
To infer from style to context is different from letting context
explain style or from corroborating context with style. It is to treat
Figure 2. Reconstruction of the Sword God relief (drawing by Václav Magid, ©
Václav Magid).
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stylistic configuration as providing an independent access point into
circumstances of production, circulation, and use. To regard similar
inferences as legitimate modes of research is to assume that isolating
principles of stylization may potentially contribute to social or his-
torical knowledge wherever these principles obtain. In other
words, it is to presume that stylistic analysis may provide original
insight into the nature of a collective based on the presence of a
style: The style is no more an explanandum, it is an explanans.
This does not mean that stylistic analysis can ‘substitute for
history’ (Sauerländer 1983, 267). It is a rare breed of a historian
who would share the excessive optimism captured in the modernist
architect Adolf Loos’s claim that serves as this essay’s motto. By con-
trast, the ambition is not to filter out everything one might know
about the Hittites and rely purely on the Sword God’s style to
learn of its context. The claim would rather be that stylistic analysis
may legitimately enrich our knowledge of the Sword God’s context by
providing access to information that is encoded in the style itself.
The aim of this paper is to present the claim in as intellectually
coherent a way as possible.
Figure 3. Hilt of a votive sword, c.1800 BCE, Diyarbakır, Turkey (reproduced
from Seeher 2011, 114).
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3. Collective style and socio-historical enquiry
The notion of visual style as it is used here is confined to objects of
material culture. It amounts to a mode or type of visible configuration
or delivery that is recognized as instantiated by a particular object and
therefore as at least potentially not unique to this object – even if it may
be the only extant realization of the style (comp. Schapiro 1953; Ackerman
1962; Gombrich 1968; Sauerländer 1983; Hodder 1990; Davis 1996; Lang
1998; Elsner 2003; Pinotti 2012). ‘Context’ refers to any non-stylistic his-
torical variables that may co-determine the appearance of a style such as
functionality, norms of making or behaving, social structure, or infor-
mation exchange. Let us review three ways in which collective visual
style has been understood to reveal information about context.
(1) When visual style analysis is used in historical or social inquiry, it is
often assumed that there are certain limits to who can legitimately repli-
cate stylistic properties (Neer 2005, 11–12). So, for example, a genuinely
individual or personal style is often taken as a signature style in that it
can only be delivered by one particular individual (Wollheim 1987, 184).
Or an artifact may be treated as truly done in a collective style such as a
period, tribal, clan, or household style only when its history of production
places it squarely within that social unit. In such cases, visual style analy-
sis establishes replication patterns within a class of artifacts with the same
history of production. On its own, such an analysis may help ascribe an
artifact of unknown origin to its proper context of production or identify
a common pedigree of a set of stylistically similar artifacts, with the
proviso that the classification is incomplete unless and until corroborated
by extra-stylistic facts to avoid misidentifying a fake, a stylistic borrowing,
or an object with an altogether different origin (Davis 1996; Neer 2010, 6–
11). But nothing about the stylistic configuration as such helps clarify the
motivations behind its implementation.
One comes across such a use of stylistic analysis whenever style is
treated as ‘diagnostic or idiomatic of ethnicity’ (Sackett 1990, 33) or as
‘localizing social units in time and space’ (Bettinger, Boyd, and Richerson
1996, 133) in the sense that its presence does no more than signal a pro-
ducing community. No further claims about the collective style’s expres-
sive or signifying potential are made, nor is the signaling treated as
following general style-context-matching principles. In processual archae-
ology (particularly in ‘ceramic sociology’), fluctuations in stylistic variabil-
ity across time or space were often explained as correlating with shifts in
social stratifications: the greater or more rigid the hierarchical stratifica-
tion of a society, the greater the stylistic complexity (e.g. Fischer 1961;
Merrill 1987, revived more recently by Peregrine 2007). The stylistic vari-
ations were claimed to follow universal deductive principles, but the prin-
ciples did not address the particular configurations of the decoration (for
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decoration was what ‘style’ meant in this scholarship) and what they may
have revealed of their context (e.g. Plog 1980; Pollock 1983).3
(2) A more ambitious use of visual style analysis in social or historical
inquiry treats it as complementing the analysis of an individual or a com-
munity within which the stylized artifacts are produced and circulated. In
identifying correctly an artifact’s style, one can corroborate or build on the
body of knowledge about the values or motivations of an individual or col-
lective agency responsible for the artifact’s production. An individual style
is treated as the product of the psychological outlook of the individual and
along with other behavioral patterns contributes to a larger picture of said
individual’s psychological profile. Similarly, a collective style is informed
by and contributes to the form of life shared by the collective, meaning sty-
listic analysis can provide an access point to understanding it. Typically,
one’s reading of a collective style relies on endemic ethnographic or his-
torical circumstances of production that tie the style uniquely to a particu-
lar time and place. Because of its role as complementing or corroborating
non-stylistic evidence, this stylistic analysis is not an independent source
of information underived from the context. It is thus perhaps better
understood as a method of letting the context explain the collective style
rather than the other way around.
In his explanation of traditional Maori designs and decoration, which is
predicated on a structuralist homology between visual collective style and
underlying social structure, Hanson (1983, 78) observes that Maori
designs are ‘studies of nearly mathematical precision in bilateral sym-
metry’ and argues that these patterns correspond to ‘large segments of
Maori myth, religion, traditional history, and social, economic, and politi-
cal behaviour’ which are also ‘organized in terms of duality’ (79). Maori
people make sense of the world in dualistic fashion, Hanson claims, and
this structure underlies all their cultural institutions, including their
visual art (Figure 4). In his discussion of the Marquesan art style and its
relationship to community, Gell (1998, 216) dismisses what he takes to
be Hanson’s reification of culture into a ‘“head office” which decrees […]
what artifacts will look like’. Instead, he sketches an explanation of the
influence of culture on style that consists in isolating an ‘axis of coherence’
governing the modus operandi of a collective style (effectively a descrip-
tion of its general formal procedures). This axis is then to be traced to
the modus operandi in other areas of production in the given society. If
these axes of coherence or structural principles match each other, as
Gell argues they do in the case of Marquesans, then one is justified in
viewing the stylistic system as motivated by the principles organizing its
producing culture (Figure 5; Gell 1998, 219–220). Style is explained by
reference to the specific forms of comportment in a given society: artifacts
take on stylistic features because certain norms of production and use
obtain across the various branches of culture and not because these
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Figure 4. House Post Figure (Amo), c.1800, Maori people / Te Arawa, New
Zealand, wood, 109.2 × 27.9 × 12.7 cm, Metropolitan Museum, CC0 1.0 Universal.
Figure 5. Stilt Step (Tapuvae), late 19th or early 20th century, Marquesan, wood,
36.2 × 6.4 × 10.8 cm, Brooklyn Museum, Creative Commons-BY (Photo: Brook-
lyn Museum).
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features issue from or somehow ‘express’ a culture. Gell’s criticism not-
withstanding, both Hanson and Gell engage in a similar project: they
treat visual collective style as informed by a recognized underlying struc-
ture to which it in turn provides an access (for another example, seeWash-
burn 1999).
(3) An even more ambitious socio-historical application of visual style
analysis generalizes from the findings of context-based style analysis to
produce universal principles of style-context correlation. It treats certain
stylistic features as universally indicative of extra-stylistic context
informing the style. This kind of visual style analysis – let’s call it ‘uni-
versal visual style analysis’ – relies on the possibility of isolating
instances of a universal style. The claim to universality of a collective
style does not rest in its universal visibility to an ‘innocent eye’ unin-
formed by the historical circumstances, however. Rather, its universality
is established by its potential universal availability: the style materializes
wherever its constitutive visible features are replicated, regardless of the
context (Wollheim 1995, 46; Davis 1996, 173). Any style, no matter how
locally restricted its incidence (including if only one individual producer
has been involved or if only one specimen of the style survives), is effec-
tively treated as universal, when it implies a universal community of
producers and observers. Because its principles of visual configuration
can be abstracted from its historical context, anyone applying or recog-
nizing the principles is a member of that community. It follows that uni-
versal style is collective not because its instantiations are identified with
a historical community of producers, but because, in principle, anyone
can work in it.
Universal visual style analysis strives to infer from the instantiation of
visual styles their non-stylistic context. For such an inference to be poss-
ible, it is not enough that universal visual styles be potentially universally
visible; they must also be non-conventional.4 This characteristic means
that a universal style’s implementation is not based on purely convention-
al grounds, but rather creates, or is motivated by, its relation to context.
So, while there may be universal styles that are conventional – their
instances do not indicate in themselves anything about their context –
the only kind of universal style that carries an explanatory force in a
socio-historical inquiry is the non-conventional kind.
It would be difficult to find anyone post-World War II explicitly main-
taining, in line with Loos, that wherever a certain visual style obtains, it
necessarily correlates with particular collective constellation.5 This
would amount to defending a version of universal visual style analysis
that sources extra-stylistic information strictly from style in a determinis-
tic fashion. As Gell (1998, 216) puts it forcefully, ‘one certainly cannot
argue […] directly from stylistic properties of artworks (such as bifold
symmetry) to properties of socio-cultural systems’. The most obvious
210 J. Stejskal
reason why one cannot infer context from the style in this fashion is that
replications of style do not necessarily correlate with reproductions of
context: a style may survive its original context or spread to other, radi-
cally different contexts (Davis 1996, 187; Descola 2006, 170–171). In
order to remain immune to this criticism, a viable explanation would be
needed for how and why a universal style necessarily issues from or
signals a particular non-stylistic context.
Lévi-Strauss’s (2006) interpretation of split representation probably
comes closest to the Loosian position. As originally described by Boas
(1927, 221–231) for Northwest Coast groups of North America, in split
representation the subject of depiction is split and projected onto a flat
surface so that the front view is represented as composed of two identical
profiles (Figure 6). Split representation thus represents a sub-class of ver-
tical bilateral symmetry. Lévi-Strauss understands split representation
more broadly as a dislocation of a three-dimensional subject into elements
that are put together again on a plane following arbitrary rules.6 He claims
that the violence of disfiguring and then reconfiguring the subject of depic-
tion in split representation visually represents – or visually negates (Lévi-
Strauss 1961) – strict supernaturally sanctioned delimitations of human
culture from nature, but also of various social stratifications within the
human world. In short, split representation gives visual expression to a
Figure 6. Household Box Representing Killer Whale (Taod), late 19th century,
Northwest Coast, wood, pigment, 29.5 × 25 cm, Brooklyn Museum, Creative
Commons-BY (Photo: Brooklyn Museum).
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socially rigid caste structure – or, on his alternative account (Lévi-Strauss
1961), it provides an imaginary overcoming of the caste structure.
In contrast to Loos, Lévi-Strauss does not infer such universal social
implications of split representation simply from the stylistic properties
and in total disregard of any ethnography. He relies, rather, on his field
research among the Caduveo of the Amazon, and the work of other scho-
lars studying visual cultures employing split representation (Lévi-Strauss
2006, 56). He then looks for common aspects of their social structure and
finds it in a ‘chain of privileges, emblems, and degrees of prestige which,
by means of masks, validate social hierarchy through the primacy of gen-
ealogies’ (69). Lévi-Strauss’s hope is that a valid style analysis will contrib-
ute to, and in cases when little other information is available, even provide
a major means of social analysis:
Even if we knew nothing about archaic Chinese society, an inspection of its
art would be sufficient to enable us to recognize prestige struggles, rivalry
between hierarchies, and competition between social and economic privi-
leges – showing through the function of masks and the veneration of
lineages. (69)
This passage is, in fact, as close as Lévi-Strauss’s rhetoric comes to Loos’s.
The details of his argument, however, suggest a more moderate position.
He first reads from the ethnography of the Caduveo to split represen-
tation, just as Hanson does with respect to Maori style and Gell with
respect to Marquesan style; second, he abstracts from the local context
universal principles of split representation; third, he takes its manifes-
tations as pointing to a particular social structure which it is a functional
part of. The claim is not that the presence of split representation signals
necessarily the presence of a rigid caste society, but rather that its pres-
ence increases the likelihood of such a structure, especially when com-
bined with other evidence such as the apparent reliance onmasks in ritual.
Neither of the two first strategies described above relies on inference
from style’s character to its context. The first strategy does not purport
to draw from stylistic configuration anything apart from establishing
matching visual taxonomy for objects with the same history of production.
The second strategy builds on non-stylistic evidence and looks to style’s
character for its corroboration or extension. It is only the third strategy
that passes muster: stylistic configuration (not its accidence or variation)
is to provide an independent access point to context.
4. Universal style and instrumental structure
Universal style is this essay’s prime subject: if stylistic features are to
provide an independent source of insight into context, not one derived
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from or corroborating it, they will have to be universally recognizable
regardless of context. Universal style differs from typical notions of collec-
tive style, such as the style of a school, a nation, or a period (Wölfflin 2015,
88–90), as long as the identification of these depends on tracing a
common history of production. The typical approach to establishing a
non-conventional relation between style and context follows a general
principle that whatever historical or ethnographic knowledge such analy-
sis claims to provide, it does not concern any general purposefulness arti-
facts (of a particular style) have. In other words, while onemay learnmuch
about a community starting from the appearance of its tools – based on
what these tools seem to be used for – this needs to be distinguished
from learning about that community based on the style of the tools.
When the nineteenth-century adherents of the expressivist paradigm
like John Ruskin and Hyppolite Taine looked with self-assuredness to
the exterior of the Doge’s Palace or the interior of the Church of the
Gesù for genuine and reliable expressions of the changing mores of the
Venetian Republic or the Jesuit Order respectively, they were not inter-
ested in what the architectonic features revealed about the buildings’ pre-
scribed functionality; they believed, rather, that their appearance
somehow tracked the moral substance of their times (Haskell 1995,
304–362).
On some accounts, driving a wedge between instrumental structure
and style is untenable because the very instantiation of such a structure
is unavoidably stylistic and distinguishing a stylistic from an instrumental
feature is therefore impossible (Hodder 1990, 45; Neer 2005, 5). But one
can grant that there is no clear-cut distinction between style and instru-
mental structure and still maintain that describing, say, a clay vessel as
a knee-high curved container that can hold liquids without capsizing
and be manipulated by a single grown-up human tells us little about its
style, although it arguably tells us a lot (sometimes all we need to know)
about its visible instrumental structure. Compare this description with
one that focuses more on, say, its particular curvature, color shade,
texture, decoration, and its mode of delivery. Even if some of these
aspects affect its functionality, a taxonomy that will group the clay
vessel with others based on such aspects will readily be recognized as sty-
listic. Furthermore, an interpretation that will use this taxonomy to infer
historical knowledge about the producing community – even if only to
identify it as this-style-of-vessel-people – will be distinguishable from
an interpretation that draws inferences from the instrumental structure
about, for example, the agriculture or economy of a society in which
such a structure occurs.
To classify objects based on their instrumental structure is to be
involved in what has been described as ‘artifact hermeneutics’ (Dennett
1990). Some artifact hermeneuticians claim that the function of an artifact
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is determined by makers’ intentions (Vaesen and Amerongen 2008).
Others argue that the function is determined by what the artifact is opti-
mally suited for (Dennett 1990). Yet others think that it is determined by
what the artifact type has been selected for (Eaton 2020). Regardless of
the interpretation, artifact hermeneuticians stress analyzing artifacts’
appearances for clues to their general purpose (say, to hold liquids or
solids, to be used for cutting or stabbing, as a garment, as a blanket,
and so on). This explains why in their accounts imagined or real archae-
ological scenarios of inferring from structure to function receive such a
prominent place as paradigm cases (Dennett 1990, 182–184; Vaesen
and Amerongen 2008, 787–791; Eaton 2020, 36–37). Indispensable for
archaeological field work but little theorized (Neer 2005, 3–8), the prac-
tice of inferring from structure to function is predicated on the sound
assumption that artifacts often publicly signal their function through
their structural properties (Thomasson 2014): by being so structured,
objects both become functional and signal their functionality publicly,
that is, in ways familiar to target users.7 The archaeological heuristic
requires also that they signal their functionality in a way that is accessible
to those who may not be fully initiated to the specific cultural norms of use
(for example, archaeologists). Arguably, it is accessible because their mor-
phology is perceived as analogous to the instrumental structure of artifacts
of known or universal purpose (as is generally the case with the vessels).
But such inferences from analogy cannot provide logical certainty
and are always under suspicion for anachronic projection. They can,
however, be strengthened, as Wylie (2002, 150) has argued, by incorpor-
ating the form of the artifact under investigation into a broader cluster
of analogous co-occurrences. If successful, such a move increases the
likelihood of similar purposes. One may also stress the extensive simi-
larity between the structure of the artifact under investigation and the
structure of the artifacts with established function (Wylie 2002, 150).
The tentative and partly speculative nature of such endeavors just
comes with the territory of artifact hermeneutics: the involvement of
local ontologies8 and external observer’s biases9 (of the kind Wylie has
sought to neutralize) creates a constellation in which any claim to uni-
versality – such as ‘this instrumental structure signals universally this
proper functionality’ – can only aspire to what I want to call a weak uni-
versality. Weak universality in effect relies on pragmatic abductive
reasoning about what tends to be the case when certain conditions co-
occur rather than on iron-clad deductive inferences. Any artifact herme-
neutics identifying universal instrumental structures should be content
with such a weak universality lest it fail to take into account that repro-
ductions of structure often survive the prescribed functionality motivat-
ing their shape.10
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It may be illuminating to ask why the assumption that public artifacts
tend to provide clues of their general function by their structure and thus
provide a (weak) universal access point for artifact hermeneutics fares
better in this regard than the suggestion that a collective visual style – a
collective mode or type of visible configuration or delivery – can be univer-
sally and non-conventionally indicative of its context, that is, can be the
subject of a stylistic hermeneutics, or, of what I have called universal
visual style analysis. Why can’t we model such an analysis on artifact
hermeneutics?
A major difference between the use of stylistic analysis and instrumen-
tal structure analysis in socio-historical inquiry is that it is presumed that
whatever purpose an artifact is mandated to serve should play no part in
explaining what its style can tell us about its context. Classifying some-
thing as having been done in a collective style is assumed to be a different
cognitive act than classifying it as having been done to serve a general
purpose. While it is recognized that an important role of visual style is
to individuate instrumental structure, this stylistic individuation is often
treated as arbitrary, random, or ‘isochrestic’ – it is subject to individual
and locally sanctioned ways of making, more or less equivalent as to
their utility value (Dunnell 1978; Sackett 1990). Others have correctly
objected that such a local style may become recognized as typical both
within and outside the community of makers and perhaps be elevated to
a distinguishing mark of the community and consequently acquire
various symbolic meanings – a ‘passive’ style turns ‘active’ or ‘emblemic’
(Wobst 1977; Wiessner 1983, 257–258; Sackett 1990; Summers 2003,
64–66). Recovering these conventional meanings, however, cannot fall
within the purview of universal visual style analysis as long as nothing
in the visual style itself establishes the symbolism – as long as it is
taken for granted that ‘the precise form of a style has no function’ (Richer-
son and Boyd 2005, 249).11 From this view, universal visual style analysis
cannot relate style to context in instrumental terms, as it is only within the
purview of artifact hermeneutics to infer from structure (‘precise form’) to
function, even when very little is known about its context beforehand.
What remains for universal style analysis is to rely on some kind of uni-
versal stylistic semiotic: an object rendered in a universal non-convention-
al style signals to the analyst its particular role and place in its social
environment independent of whatever instrumental structure it may
possess. To explain the correlation between universal style and context
in both non-instrumental and non-circular terms, however, has been a
tall order. Critics have observed that what underlies or motivates the
mapping of a style onto a context has never been convincingly explained
or made clear (Gombrich 1963; Wollheim 1995). The criticism certainly
applies to Lévi-Strauss’s writings on split representation; Gell’s
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observations on Hanson noted above are also a thinly veiled attack on this
aspect of Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism.
It may at first not be clear why the idea that style analysis can provide
an independent source of insight into an artifact’s non-stylistic context
must always take the form of identifying non-instrumental links
between collective styles and underlying social relations. Why not
simply ground the non-conventionality of a universal style in its making
visible the universal instrumental structure of artifacts? An object ren-
dered in a universally visible, non-conventional style would draw its uni-
versality and non-conventionality from its role in mediating instrumental
structure. This answer, however, comes dangerously close to collapsing
the difference between the social analysis of instrumental structure and
the social analysis of collective style. To come back to my example, most
of the vessels in the world can be recognized thanks to their common
instrumental structure (a curved container that can hold liquids without
capsizing and can be manipulated by a single grown-up human). But it
would be counter-intuitive to call this instrumental structure their univer-
sal style. If anything, a style is a mode of realizing instrumental structure.
And since the ambition of isolating universal style was to provide socio-
historical inquiry with an independent source of insight relying on stylistic
properties, this approach serves to disqualify the ambition more than any-
thing else.
To sum up this section, a public artifact often makes its instrumental
value universally visible by its non-conventional structure and this struc-
ture’s particular instantiation is subject to stylistic variation. If universal
style analysis is to contribute to socio-historical inquiry, the stylistic vari-
ation cannot be always completely conventional, random, or arbitrary.
Either the source of a style’s non-conventionality is non-instrumental
and then something like a universal principle of style-context correlation
applies – a contention that has been regarded with great suspicion – or its
non-conventionality is grounded in instrumental structure and the differ-
ence between instrumental structure and universal style collapses.
5. Universal style as instrumental structure
For a universal visual style hermeneutician there are two potential ways
out of this impasse. One can pursue the path of a universal stylistic semio-
tics, arguing for the existence of stylistic principles whose application
counts towards co-occurrence of certain contexts. This would bring up
the need to explain the co-occurrence. The other path is to associate uni-
versal styles with instrumental structures, which creates the problem of
keeping universal visual style analysis different from artifact hermeneu-
tics. It has been noted already that criticisms of collective style analysis
in socio-historical enquiry affect primarily the first option. Whatever its
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chance of succeeding (and I take it to be slim), we need not explore this
here. Instead, what remains of this essay will be devoted to the second
pathway, that is, the possibility of grounding universal style’s non-conven-
tional character in instrumentality.
For social or historical enquiry, what I propose is to treat universal
style as universal instrumental structure (structure likely to have been
developed/selected/intended for certain general functions or purposes).
Just like an instrumental structure, a non-conventional universal visual
style is a means of satisfying a need or desire while signaling publicly
the mandate to be so used.
The advantage of this approach becomes apparent when confronted
with what may be labeled as the epistemological problem of universal
visual style analysis. Social enquiry relying on universal visual style analy-
sis is predicated on the possibility that there are collective styles open to
analysis from an observer perspective. But what cognitive capabilities
does the hermeneutist employ to recover a style’s context? A collective
style may be ‘active’, that is, epistemically effective within a participant
(‘emic’) perspective: it is intended to show or prescribe certain patterns
of thought or behavior to those with the mandate to observe the artifacts.
Or it may be ‘passive’, meaning, it is not thematized by the participants,
but it may provide epistemic access from an observer (‘etic’) perspective:
showing to the uninitiated certain ways of the participants’ world (Sackett
1990). Sometimes, a style is taken to reveal different things to participants
and different things to observers, or to be effective on different levels of
awareness. For example, a collective style could be claimed to be effective
precisely because its proper role is mis-recognized by participants; it is for
this very reason more susceptible to analysis by those immune to its
effects and experiencing them sideways-on, so to speak (e.g. Forge 1973,
xviii–xix; 1979, 284). On the non-instrumental understanding of the
style-context relation, the stylistic hermeneutist ought to be clear about
the channels of stylistic communication – to whom style reveals the
context and how the hermeneutist tunes in on it. For the instrumental
approach, the problem does not press itself with any great urgency, as
the solution is more or less self-evident. To whom is style as instrumental
structure supposed to reveal or prescribe contextual information? To
potential users, it reveals or prescribes norms of use because it makes
an artifact’s instrumentality visually salient to them, in other words, it
makes it public. And because it is publicly visible, the instrumental struc-
ture potentially provides social scientists with an entry point into practices
of artifact production, use, and distribution.
The main disadvantage of the instrumental approach is that the differ-
ence between style and instrumental structure is in danger of collapsing.
Luckily, the difference does not need to evaporate. A difference between
style and structure comes in handy when one needs to address non-
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conventional shifts in morphological variation within an identified instru-
mental structure. When a universal instrumental structure is identified,
universal styles will be sub-classes of the instrumental structure tracking
morphological variations. Such universal styles will themselves be non-
conventional, if their variations are deemed as affecting instrumentality
– they comprise instrumental styles, in other words. For example, some
Acheulean bifaces, produced by our hominin ancestors, are symmetrical
beyond need; some are either too big or too small, or just too oddly
shaped to be used as hand-axes (Figure 7; Mithen 2003; Currie 2011).
Such morphological variations may affect instrumentality and invite
speculations about what the structures could have been instrumental
for. Whatever the answer to that question, for my argument here, the
shifts in morphology within the instrumental structure are properly
called stylistic. There is no universal, non-conventional style without
instrumental structure. Furthermore, each such style becomes effectively
an instrumental structure, when further non-conventional stylistic vari-
ations are identified within it. The distinction between instrumental struc-
ture and a universal non-conventional style is thus a matter of scale; it is
relative to the taxonomist’s perspective, but with the proviso that it is a
perspective that can be allowed only to zoom in or out within a taxonomic
system tracking instrumentality of structure/style. In other words, the
taxonomist cannot introduce arbitrary parameters as to what counts as
a structural/stylistic feature and what does not.
This suggestion has two major advantages. First, by recognizing those
features that vary within an instrumental structure class as stylistic, it
honors the intuition that instrumental structure analysis differs from sty-
listic analysis because it works on a different scale. Second, by associating
universal non-conventional styles with instrumental structures, it steers
clear of the serious problems plaguing non-instrumental explanations of
Figure 7. Nine Acheulean Bifaces, 700,000–200,000 BCE, France, flint, quart-
zite, Metropolitan Museum, CC0 1.0 Universal.
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style-context correlations. To show the advantages of this approach, I will
apply it to the case of the Sword God. The discussion will be brief for
reasons of space and fuller elaboration is planned elsewhere. What I
hope to demonstrate, however, is a new direction for style-based research
and to reveal what the dominance of non-instrumental approaches to
visual styles has pushed to the margins.
The most evident instrumental feature of the Sword God is its figura-
tive content. Images – whether two- or three-dimensional – serve the
general purpose of conveying their figurative content (e.g. Hyman
2012); and this general purpose is inscribed in their very configuration.
We may not know what the Sword God refers to, but we recognize it as
a bearer of figurative content. In other words, we recognize its universal
instrumental structure of an image.
To discuss its universal structural/stylistic features, I will therefore
focus on its pictorial nature. My notion of its pictorial style is based on
the general characterization of visual style provided earlier, and it corre-
sponds to a general mode of pictorial configuration instantiated by a par-
ticular image (the Sword God). We want to know how the Sword God
image sheds light on its context, and arguably, to already characterize
something as an image is to identify its instrumental structure: the non-
conventional nature of its morphology is rooted in its instrumentality for
conveying figurative content. To describe the condition of having figurative
content as a pictorial style is, however, strongly counter-intuitive, just as it
was counter-intuitive to treat the condition of being a vessel as enough to
classify its visual style. Stylistic variation is a variationwithin an instrumen-
tal structure. And when this variation is also instrumental, we have ident-
ified a universal non-conventional style. In the case of the Sword God, a
good candidate for such a variation is the vertical bilateral symmetry as
its organizing principle. The central question then is, how its implemen-
tation affects its instrumentality.
For this purpose, I want to briefly make use of Summers’s (2003, 349–
353) treatment of what he terms ‘planarity’. I turn to Summers because his
brand of art-historical postformalism is developed in explicit opposition to
the expressivist paradigm of inferring from style to context (32–34; see
also Summers 1989), yet he does not shy away from speculating about
context based on artifacts’ purposeful configurations.12 According to
Summers, the precondition of any image-making is the ability to perceive
a facing surface of an object as notionally planar (roughly: as a geometric
plane). Some images make this condition explicit – as is the case with
images employing vertical bilateral symmetry (Figure 8). Explicitly
planar images have their figurative content ordered in such a way that it
conforms to the maximum with the planar uniformity of the image
surface: the content is schematically spread out onto the surface (or
virtual plane). Summers argues that explicitly planar images, such as
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those following vertical bilateral symmetry, have historically and globally
opened the way for making images semantically charged beyond convey-
ing resemblances. As opposed to mere tracing of outline shapes (as in
Paleolithic cave paintings of animals), explicit planarity invites the sche-
matization and hierarchical structuring of the figurative content as well
as the conventionalization of meaning, such as when a pubic triangle of
a Paleolithic Venus lends itself to be abstracted as a symbol of fertility
(Summers 2003, 346–349). An explicitly planar ordering is also, accord-
ing to Summers, equally suitable – and has been developed globally – to
enhance the sense of authoritative, effective presence of the depicted
subject. As each and every part of an explicitly planar image addresses a
Figure 8. Coatlicue statue, 15th Century CE, Aztec, andesite, 2.52 m, Museo
Nacional de Antropología, Mexico City. © Luidger, retrieved from https://
commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:20041229-Coatlicue_(Museo_Nacional_de_
Antropolog%C3%ADa)_MQ-3.jpg, Creative Commons BY-SA 3.0 (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/).
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point of view perpendicular to the surface, it demands a humanly imposs-
ible viewing position (Summers 2003, 350–353; see also Hagen 1986,
116–176). Such an explicit subordination of figurative content to a geo-
metric planar ordering would serve the manifestation of the image’s inde-
pendence from a particular viewing angle and help create a sense of
overbearing presence.
Vertical bilateral symmetry of the Sword God is a clear example of
explicit planar imagery; it is a ‘double planar representation’ (Summers
2003, 372). It explicitly schematizes figurative content around a vertical
axis to render the mirrored design values mutually equivalent. Applying
Summers’s proposal to the interpretation of the Sword God, vertical bilat-
eral symmetry would be introduced to stress the symbolic features of the
figurative content (see also Morphy 1977) or to make its figurative con-
tent’s presence more commanding. The former, symbolic interpretation
finds indirect support in the fact that the Sword God lacks any hiero-
glyphic identification, making it ‘unusual among the large figures of Yazı-
lıkaya’ (Alexander 1986, 62). ‘Apparently,’ conjectures Alexander, ‘he
names himself’, suggesting that the relief itself might have served as a pic-
tographic symbol. This conjecture is in line with Summers’s reading, for
the Sword God’s bilateral symmetry increases its potential for symbolic
use. The latter interpretation is consistent with the spatial aspects of the
relief’s format. With its 3.38 m, the Sword God towers above the spectator
who is confined to a narrow cleft just about three meters wide. The socially
sanctioned desire the relief would meet could thus be described as one of
creating a sense of a fuller, efficacious presence of the figurative content,
translating the social authority of depicted subjects into the visual auth-
ority of images.
Here thus is the promise of a universal visual style analysis: by identi-
fying an artifact’s appearance as exemplifying a universal style, it opens
access to insights about its socio-historical context. I have proposed that
this identification be understood as isolating a non-conventional, instru-
mental variation within an instrumental structure. A style’s instrumental-
ity links it to context: vertical bilateral symmetry aligns figurative content
explicitly around a vertical axis in a process of schematization that makes
the image prone to symbolization as well as helps establish the figurative
content’s commanding presence. Identifying this non-conventional vari-
ation of an instrumental structure (image) in the Sword God does not
determine beyond any doubt that the relief actually served either or
both of the functions. In accordance with the principle of weak universal-
ity, the variation’s implementation counts towards a particular context of
use, especially when combined with other evidence such as the relief’s
spatial coordinates and the absence of hieroglyphic designation. This
other evidence does provide some further justification as to why one
would want to implement vertical bilateral symmetry in this particular
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instance. But what made this line of interpretation possible in the first
place was inferring from the Sword God’s style to its context.13
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